DO NOT SCRATCH YOUR EYES
THE WATFORD JOURNAL
THURSDAY 12 NOVEMBER 2026OPERATION LÍBERO · DAY THREE
DAY 3: Spain’s tax investigators told the Audiencia Nacional that documents tied Gino Pozzo to four UAE companies whose money flowed through Luxembourg into player rights. Their sharpest example of a club acting against its own interests: Granada’s 2015 repurchase of seven players from Fifteen for more than the fund had paid. Defence experts said the structure shared risk, protected cash and was properly accounted for.
THE LEAD · AUDIENCIA NACIONAL, MADRID

Four UAE companies, seven buy-backs — and two irreconcilable readings of the money

Thursday’s third day was not a reprise of the previous session’s corporate history. It was the day the fiscal case and the defence case met head-on. Officials from the National Fraud Investigation Office (ONIF), within Spain’s Tax Agency, were questioned about who ultimately controlled the money channelled through Fifteen Securitisation and whether Granada CF’s decisions made economic sense for Granada.

The officials’ answer was that the apparent external financing was, in substance, money from entities controlled by Pozzo. Defence experts answered that the structure was genuine investment: Fifteen bore the greater risk, Granada secured access to players it could not otherwise afford and the club’s smaller return reflected that allocation of risk.

These remain opposing expert opinions and allegations tested at trial. The court has not ruled that either account is proved.

4UAE companies whose records, an ONIF expert said, identified Pozzo as ultimate controller
7players Granada allegedly repurchased from Fifteen in 2015 at a higher price
5%Granada’s limited return under the defence explanation, reflecting its claimed lack of risk
THURSDAY’S HEARING · IN ORDER

What the court heard on Day 3

ONIF officials resume under State Advocate questioning

The hearing continued the expert evidence begun on Wednesday. On Thursday, officials who prepared the corporation-tax fraud reports were questioned principally by the lawyer for the State. AS reported that ONIF maintained its investigative conclusions: Pozzo exercised effective control over Daxian 2009, Granada’s majority shareholder, and decision-making power over the club’s principal operations.

The four UAE companies move to the centre of the case

According to Ahora Granada’s report from the hearing, an ONIF expert said documents found at the office where Luxembourg-based Fifteen had its address identified the holders of four UAE companies. The expert said the material showed Pozzo as their beneficiary from 2013 and included, for each entity, documents in which Pozzo acknowledged that he exercised ultimate control.

The expert’s conclusion was that funds sent by those four companies for investment in footballers’ economic rights came from “entities of Mr Pozzo”. That matters to the prosecution theory because it challenges the appearance that Granada was dealing with a genuinely independent outside investor. It does not, by itself, decide the tax treatment; that is precisely what the court must assess.

Investigators allege a circular flow

The officials also referred to statements attributed to Quique Pina that Pozzo made the decisions on signings and transfers. They described money moving from Fifteen to Granada as “circular”, saying Granada bank records showed funds with their origin and destination in the club. The fiscal case therefore asks whether purported external finance was instead a route by which value generated within Pozzo-controlled structures returned under contracts that shifted most of the upside away from Granada.

A comparison: Luis Martins and Doyen Sports

The hearing examined a contract presented as genuinely external. Doyen Sports supplied €500,000 towards Luis Martins and reserved protections including a minimum price and a sale if Granada received a €2 million offer. An AEAT expert said this did not leave the transfer decision entirely to Granada, but regarded its risk distribution as materially different from the Fifteen contracts. The comparison was used to explain why the investigators did not treat every third-party player investment alike.

The seven-player repurchase becomes the day’s hardest example

The ONIF expert said Granada appeared to take decisions “against its interests” when, in 2015, it repurchased seven footballers from Fifteen for more than Fifteen had originally paid when those players were acquired. The expert linked the timing to Pozzo considering a sale of the club, ultimately completed in 2016.

The official’s interpretation was that the portfolio was reviewed and Granada bought back players from whose later transfers the club otherwise would not profit. The expert said it was not economically reasonable for Granada to accept the repurchase, or for Fifteen to make that offer. This was Thursday’s evidence about the seven Fifteen buy-backs; it should not be confused with the separate, earlier Orange Chiffon transaction discussed on Day 1.

Defence experts: the higher return followed the higher risk

Experts called by the defence said Granada bore no investment risk and therefore received a limited 5% return, while the fund exposed to the greater risk received most of any capital gain. They called the arrangement good for the club because it opened access to players beyond Granada’s own means and represented prudent cash management.

One expert argued that it was incompatible to characterise the transactions as simulated while also applying the statutory limitation on financial expenses. The same expert described Fifteen as Granada’s investment fund, said the expense was recorded in the accounts and deductible, and argued that it could be treated as a business benefit.

Granada’s expert turns to safeguards installed from 2016

A separate expert proposed by Granada described auditing a protocol and programme introduced from 2016 to prevent tax fraud, alongside LaLiga’s financial-control obligations. The expert said systems had been reviewed, minor weaknesses prompted improvements and staff awareness was tested across the organisation. In the expert’s view, the present controls make many tax offences impossible if the procedures are followed.

This evidence concerns later compliance measures. It does not determine whether offences were committed in the 2013–15 tax years now before the court.

THE DAY 3 DIVIDE

ONIF/AEAT: the UAE money came from Pozzo-controlled entities; the flow was circular; several transactions lacked business logic for Granada; and the seven-player repurchase favoured Fifteen over the club.

DEFENCE: Fifteen carried the risk, so its greater upside was rational; Granada gained affordable access to players and preserved cash; the expense was recorded and deductible; and the contracts were genuine, not hidden.

WHY THE SEVEN MATTER

A buy-back, not merely another transfer

The prosecution-side expert was not simply criticising a bad football bet. The alleged sequence is the point: Fifteen financed or held the relevant economic position; Granada later repurchased seven players at a higher figure; and the repurchase occurred as Pozzo was contemplating disposal of the club. If Granada paid more to recover rights that had appreciated within a structure controlled by the same ultimate decision-maker, the court must decide whether the arrangement had independent commercial substance and the correct Spanish tax consequences.

Two names had already been used in Wednesday’s evidence as examples of allegedly senseless financed-and-repurchased deals: Fatau and Wilson Cuero. Thursday’s new development was the ONIF expert’s broader explanation of the seven-player 2015 repurchase and why investigators considered it contrary to Granada’s interests.

BRIEF BACKGROUND · NOT THURSDAY’S NEWS

Aurea and Jarmorini: context from 11 November

On Wednesday, Damiano Jarmorini reportedly described Fifteen as belonging to Aurea and said Aurea managed part of the Pozzo family’s assets. He gave a reported 85/15 legal shareholding split between Raffaele De La Riva and himself, and described a 95/5 division in a series of player transactions.

That evidence supplies context for the ownership dispute but was not new testimony on Thursday. Legal shareholding, asset management and ultimate beneficial control are distinct questions. Thursday’s fresh point was the ONIF expert’s account of documents concerning the four UAE funding companies and Pozzo’s alleged ultimate control of each. No proxy arrangement concerning Aurea should be treated as established on the reporting presently available.

WATFORD & THE POZZO NETWORK

What this does — and does not — say about Watford

The evidence is relevant to Watford supporters because it examines historic player-financing and control within a multi-club network associated with the Pozzo family. It asks whether the club formally entering a transaction was also the club economically served by it.

Watford FC is not an accused party in this trial. Thursday’s testimony about Granada, Fifteen, Daxian and the four UAE entities does not establish wrongdoing by Watford.

COURT STATUS & CALENDAR

No verdict: the defendants come next

Day 3 completed the week’s scheduled evidence with the technical dispute unresolved. No finding of guilt was reported. Gino Pozzo, Quique Pina, Raffaele De La Riva and Jordi Trilles deny the accusations; Granada CF is also on trial as a legal person.

NEXT SESSION · MONDAY 16 NOVEMBER 2026

The trial is scheduled to resume at the Audiencia Nacional, with the defendants’ evidence forming the next phase. A precise public start time was not independently confirmed in the reports reviewed for this edition.

Calendar note: this edition records the next scheduled session as supplied in the established Journal calendar. AS confirms that the defendants are due to give evidence when proceedings resume the following week.

MINI SOURCE DESK

Spanish reporting checked for this edition

  1. DAY 3 · PRIMARY REPORTAhora Granada, Luis F. Ruiz — 12 November, 14:59. Detailed court report on the four UAE companies, ultimate-control documents, alleged circular funds, Luis Martins/Doyen, the seven-player repurchase, defence risk arguments and the post-2016 compliance expert. Read the Spanish report.
  2. DAY 3 · CORROBORATIONAS — updated 12 November, 15:34 CET. Independent summary of the third session: ONIF’s position on Daxian control, transactions allegedly against Granada’s interests, corporation-tax treatment and the defence contention that the Fifteen contracts were lawful and not concealed. Read the Spanish report.
  3. DAY 1 · TRANSACTION CONTEXTGranada Hoy, Enrique López — 10 November. Background on the Orange Chiffon rescue transaction and later recovery of seven players’ rights. Included only to prevent that separate episode being confused with Thursday’s evidence about the seven players repurchased from Fifteen in 2015. Read the Spanish report.
  4. DAY 2 · BACKGROUND ONLYGranada Hoy — 11 November. Jarmorini, Aurea/Fifteen and the earlier expert evidence. This is background, not presented here as Thursday’s news. Read the Spanish report.

Editorial method: Assertions are attributed to the witness, expert, prosecution or defence advancing them. “Reported”, “alleged” and equivalent language is retained where the court has not made a finding. Direct quotations are short and taken from the linked Spanish reports.